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The Constitutionality of School Corporal Punishment of 
Children as a Betrayal of Brown v. Board of Education 
Susan H. Bitensky* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American judicial history, like any institutional history, has had its 
shameful moments and its glorious ones, with plenty in-between. Some 
of the worst and best of these decisions have concerned race relations. 
Consider such low points for the United States Supreme Court as Dred 
Scott v. Sandford1 and the Japanese-American restriction cases.2 The 
former, among other things, essentially upheld slavery as constitutional3 
while the latter upheld the constitutionality of the mass internment of 
and curfew imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry who lived on 
the West Coast during World War 11.4 Even taking into account that 
these decisions were creatures of other, more backward eras, their 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. B.A. 1971, Case Western 
Reserve University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Danielle 
Gross for her excellent research assistance. 
\. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
2. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming the United States war 
power right to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from military areas); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew restrictions against persons of Japanese ancestry in 
military areas). 
3. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05, 411, 425-27, 450-51 (ruling that descendants of American 
slaves were neither "citizens" nor "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution and that when 
Congress outlawed slavery in federal territory, the result was a deprivation of slaveholders' 
"property" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution subsequently nullified Dred Scott's rulings with 
respect to slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery in the United States. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII, § I. The Fourteenth Amendment states that any person born or naturalized 
in the United States is a citizen of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
4. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19 (upholding the constitutionality of exclusion of persons 
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast regardless of their individual loyalty to the United 
States during World War II); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93-102 (upholding the constitutionality of 
curfews imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry residing on the West Coast regardless of 
individual loyalty to the United States during World War 11). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 
283,297,300-04 (1944) (holding that the War Relocation Authority had no authority to subject a 
person of Japanese ancestry, who was undisputedly loyal to the United States during World War 
II, to its procedure for obtaining leave from internment). 
201 
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remembrance is still enough to make one wince.5 
Brown v. Board of Education6 ("Brown /") is, in my opinion, one of 
the United States Supreme Court's redeeming glorious moments. The 
holding, stripped to its barest essentials, is that de jure racial segregation 
of students in public elementary and secondary schools inherently 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 In 
so ruling, the Court effectively repudiated its own long-held doctrine, 
previously articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson,8 that so-called separate but 
equal facilities for whites and blacks are constitutiona1.9 The Court not 
only halted its own retrogressive momentum, but it also put itself in the 
vanguard of the nascent struggle for civil rights in a nation that was 
badly divided on the issue.lO For among whites at that time, the 
dominant sentiments toward racial segregation were represented by 
apathy in the North and sympathy in the South. I I 
The story surrounding how Brown I came to be and how it has been 
implemented is, however, somewhat less glorious than the landmark 
5. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism's Forgotten Past, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 151 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES) (describing the Dred Scott Court's conclusions as sullying "the 
Court's reputation" and labeling them "a disaster"); Neil Gotanda, The Story ofKorematsu: The 
Japanese-American Cases, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249, 257 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 
2004) (observing that the military's internment of persons of Japanese ancestry, upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court in Korematsu, was "racist"). 
6. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]. 
7. [d. at 495. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n)o 
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49, 552 (1896) (upholding under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Louisiana's racial segregation of railroad 
passengers on the theory that the facilities could be separate for the races and, at the same time, 
equal). 
9. Brown [did not expressly overrule Plessy, but its effect in the educational context was 
much the same as if it had done so. See 3 RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.8, at 331 (3d ed. 1999). 
10. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS 
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 6-7 (2001) (describing the late 1940s and early 1950s 
as the beginnings of the full-fledged civil rights movement of later years); see also Nathaniel R. 
Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The Road Not Taken-An American Tragedy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 
951, 959 (1996) (remarking that in the 1930s and 1940s the civil rights movement mostly took 
the form of litigation undermining Plessy, thus reflecting discontent among blacks well before the 
1950s when the civil rights movement began to burgeon). 
11. See PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 7-8 (describing how public opinion polls from the 
1950s revealed increasing support from northern whites for liberal policies concerning race, but 
that advocates had trouble "arousing active backing from white Northerners"); see also Robert A. 
Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REv. 377, 421 
(1954) (describing the majority of the residents of southern states as favoring racial segregation of 
the schools in the early 1950s). 
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decision itself. In 1952, the Supreme Court was first presented with the 
prospect of ruling on the constitutionality of cases that came to 
comprise Brown 1.12 Evidence suggests that the Vinson Court, so 
divided on so many issues in 1952, was likely to bring further 
divisiveness to deciding the constitutionality of public school racial 
segregation. 13 The Court delayed before ordering rehearings of the 
cases in 1953. 14 Nevertheless, political events were weighing on the 
Court to get the cases decided and decided the right way. On the 
domestic front, the Court faced the beginnings of a more vocal and 
restive civil rights movement in the black community.15 Additionally, 
considerable international embarrassment arose from tolerating 
legalized racial segregation on American soil after fighting racially 
supremacist, anti-semitic Nazis and prosecuting them at Nuremberg. 16 
In other words, the Court, rather than leaping at the chance to lead, 
rather gingerly found its way into forging a more enlightened chapter of 
race relations in the education context. 
The saga of Brown I's implementation has been, in my opinion, even 
more disappointing than the story of its genesis. Although in the 
remedial phase of the litigation, Brown v. Board of Education 17 
("Brown II"), the Court remanded to the district courts and directed 
12. PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 45-46, 52. 
13. See id. at 54-56 (discussing individual justices and their divergent views in the 1950s); See 
also Daniel Gyebi, A Tribute to Courage on the Fortieth Anniversary o/Brown v. Board of 
Education, 38 How. LJ. 23, 37 n.83 (1994) (noting the 5-4 Supreme Court split led by Chief 
Justice Vinson in favor of upholding segregation); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really 
Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870-72 (1991) 
(discussing Chief Justice Vinson's inability to lead or unify the Supreme Court). 
14. PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 57 (discussing that the reason for a scheduled re-hearing in 
June 1953 was so that Supreme Court Justices, notably Justice Frankfurter, could reflect on the 
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning schools); Tushnet & Lezin, supra 
note 13, at 1872, 1908-09. 
15. PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 56; See also Michael J. Klarman, Twentieth-Century 
Constitutional History: Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 
7, 14, 16-21 (1994); Derrick A. Bell, Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the lnterest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 524-25 (1980). 
16. See PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 56 (discussing that racial segregation in the United 
States made the "Jim Crow America vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy when it claimed to 
lead the Free World"); Steve Bachmann, Rights on Trial, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (1984) 
(book review) (discussing the conflict in the mid-1950s between the United States's role as 
"leader of the free world" and the apparent lack of freedom for segregated black people in the 
South); Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights 
Litigation, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 941 (1984) (quoting from the government's brief in Henderson 
v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), "[o]ur position and standing before the critical bar of 
world opinion are weakened if segregation not only is practiced in this country but also is 
condoned by federal law"). 
17. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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them to take measures so that petitioners could, with "all deliberate 
speed,"18 be admitted on a racially non-discriminatory basis to the 
schools involved, the parties to many subsequent school desegregation 
cases hardly took this standard to heart. The law books are littered with 
court decisions mandating grossly recalcitrant school boards to 
implement Brown 1.19 Some of the court decisions themselves arguably 
impeded progress by declining to order more thorough-going remedial 
measures.20 But that is another topic for another scholar on another day. 
I merely raise this context to show that there has been no shortage of 
obstacles to Brown I's development, even when it was only a gleam in 
Thurgood Marshall's eye. Now, some obstacles are intentionally 
created and some are unwittingly created. Many of the obstacles 
referenced above seem to belong in the intentional category. This 
article will focus from here, however, on a roadblock of the unwitting 
variety. 
II. INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT 
The particular impediment to Brown I's effectuation that I wish to 
address is Ingraham v. Wright,21 a 1977 Supreme Court decision that, 
on its face, has absolutely nothing to do with racial integration or 
harmony. In this case, petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt 
18. Id. at 301. 
19. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes Co. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19,20-21 (1969) (per curiam), 
reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 976 (1969); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,431-35,437-42 
(1968); Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 220-225, 231-33 (1964), 
mot'n granted, 377 U.S. 950 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,4,7-16 (1958). For a listing 
and summary of such cases, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 9, § 18.9, at 343, 344 & 
nn.14-15. 
20. See Susan H. Bitensky, We "Had a Dream" in Brown v. Board of Education ... , 1996 
DETROITC.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1,3-4,13 [hereinafter Bitensky, Dream) (explaining that the 
expectations and aspirations naturally inspired by Brown have, after forty-two years, remained 
substantially unfulfilled); Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The 
Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 low A L. REv. 
813,817-18 (1993) (describing that new reports indicate that schools were just as segregated in 
1990 as they were in the 1970s); Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in 
School Desegregation, 42 EMORY L.J. 863,867-69 (1993) (discussing the pre-existing views of 
judges when making decisions); Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional 
Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 627, 638-56 (1993) (discussing courts' different doctrinal 
components in assessing school segregation); Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric 
Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285-86, 1289-91 (1992) (stating that "the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated increasing antipathy toward race-conscious remedies designed to overcome 
discrimination in education, employment, and housing"); Donald E. Lively, The Effectuation and 
Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 117, 125-27 (1987) (discussing the consciousness of race while making judicial 
decisions concerning variants of segregation in schools). 
21. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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Andrews were students at a public junior high school in Florida.22 The 
state of Florida at that time had a statute permitting corporal punishment 
in schools as long as it was not "degrading or unduly severe" or was not 
administered without consulting the principa1.23 Because he did not 
follow his teacher's directions with the desired alacrity, Ingraham 
received more than twenty licks with a paddle on his clothed buttocks 
while being pinned to a table in the principal's office.24 As a result, he 
developed a hematoma requiring medical intervention and necessitating 
his absence from school for several days.25 Andrews was also paddled 
several times, sometimes on his arms, for minor violations of school 
rules.26 In one of these disciplinary sessions, he was hit so hard that he 
lost the full use of his arm for a weekY The paddle, by the way, was a 
flat, wooden affair approximately two feet long, three to four inches 
wide, and one-half inch thick.28 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear two of petitioners' claims in the 
ensuing suit. 29 The first claim was that corporal punishment of public 
school students as a disciplinary technique constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.3o 
The second claim was that administering such punishment without first 
giving students notice and an opportunity to be heard violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The Supreme Court 
rejected both claims.32 
For purposes of making the argument that the Ingraham ruling 
betrayed the promise of Brown I, it is necessary only to focus on the 
Ingraham Court's treatment of the Eighth Amendment issue. That 
22. [d. at 653. 
23. [d. at 657 n.6 (quoting Florida's statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1961), as of the 
1970-71 academic year, governing corporal punishment in the schools). 
24. See id. at 657 (holding that "school authorities viewed corporal punishment as a less 
drastic means of discipline than suspension or explusion"). 
25. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. /d. at 656. 
29. See id. at 658-59 (discussing that one count was a class action, while the other counts 
were individual damages actions concerning the Eighth Amendment). Petitioners' other claim 
was that public school corporal punishment is a substantive due process violation. See id. at 659 
n.12 (denying the review of the third question presented in the petition for certiorari: "Is the 
infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public students arbitrary, capricious and unrelated 
to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment?"). 
30. [d. at 659-60. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 671, 682. 
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Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.'m The Court essentially had one rationale for its disposition 
of the Eighth Amendment issue. However, before explaining that 
rationale, the Court seemingly strayed into a survey of "traditional 
common-law concepts" and "the 'attitude(s) which our society has 
traditionally taken ", towards corporal punishment of children in 
school. 34 The Court found the practice to be deeply entrenched in our 
history, dating back to the colonial period and continuing in most parts 
of the United States right up until the Ingraham opinion.35 
Acknowledging that professional as well as popular opinion had been at 
odds for over a century on the advisability of such punishment,36 the 
Court concluded that "we can discern no trend toward its elimination."37 
The Court likewise found the prevailing common law principle 
governing the use of this punishment in 1977 to hail as far back as the 
American Revolution or earlier,38 i.e., the principle being that school 
personnel may inflict reasonable, although not excessive force, to 
discipline children; excessive force, however, subjects the punishers to 
potential civil and criminalliability.39 
Why the Court went into this historical exegesis on the status of 
corporal punishment of schoolchildren in the United States is not 
entirely clear. The Court purportedly did not consider this description 
as part of its constitutional analysis under the Eighth Amendment, 
characterizing the whole exercise as "this background of historical and 
contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment.',40 It is 
intriguing why the Court felt compelled to set the stage so elaborately. 
One is left with the impression that this was not merely a stage set, but 
rather was tacitly integral to the Eighth Amendment analysis. That is, 
because the Court viewed school corporal punishment as a long-
standing feature of the American experience, it became legally and 
politically more comfortable for the Justices to deny children the Eighth 
Amendment's protection against the practice. Such a ruling consonant 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VITI. 
34. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968». 
35. /d. at 660. 
36. Id. at 660-61. 
37. Id. at 661. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. (discussing that "[alt common law, a single principle has governed the use of 
corporal punishment since before the American Revolution: teachers may impose reasonable but 
not excessive force to discipline a child"). 
40. Id. at 663. 
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with United States history could not, after all, open the Court to charges 
of social engineering that were alien to the nation's traditional 
normative prejudices on the subject. 
In any event, the Supreme Court's acknowledged rationale for 
rejecting petitioners' Eighth Amendment claim was that the 
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments is a 
constraint exclusively on criminal punishments and therefore cannot be 
extended to protect children from public school disciplinary 
punishments.41 According to the majority opinion, the stinginess of the 
Eighth Amendment's reach is supported by original intent42 and stare 
decisis.43 As to the latter, the Ingraham Court specified that its previous 
Eighth Amendment decisions had limited the criminal process in three 
ways.44 First, the decisions limit the type of punishment that can be 
imposed on convicts.45 Second, they bar penalties grossly 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.46 Finally, they place 
substantive limits on what activities can be classified as criminal and 
punished by the criminal justice system.47 
Petitioners argued that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could 
not have imagined the modern American compulsory public school 
system and its power to mete out non-criminal punishments.48 The 
inference, of course, is that had the Framers known, surely they would 
have desired to protect schoolchildren at least as much as they did 
prisoners. The Court attempted to counter this argument by 
distinguishing prisoners' life situations from those of schoolchildren: 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the 
public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very 
young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school 
during school hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is 
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings 
with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from 
teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances 
of rnistreatment.49 
[d. at 664-71. 
[d. at 664-66. 
[d. at 666-68. 
[d. at 667. 
[d. 
[d. 
[d. at 667. 
[d. at 668-69. 
/d. at 670. 
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I will put to one side, for the moment, the various weaknesses in the 
Ingraham majority's reasoning outlined above. There are urgent 
reasons for exposing Ingraham's problematic nature and a full expose 
of those problems will follow an explanation of the connection between 
Brown I and Ingraham. 
III. THE CONNECTION: BROWN I AND INGRAHAM 
So, what is the relationship between Brown I and Ingraham? Brown 
I's barebones holding is that de jure racial segregation of children in 
public elementary and secondary schools violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5o The factual linchpin of the 
Court's holding is the unanimous opinion's famous footnote eleven 
which references various social science publications supporting the 
proposition that racial segregation of children at these levels of 
schooling causes African-American children to feel inferior; these 
inferiority feelings, in tum, undermine the motivation of black children 
to learn and impedes their "educational and mental development" in a 
way "unlikely ever to be undone.,,51 
Thus, the whole foundation for Brown /' s holding on segregated 
schools is a fervent concern that the schools should imbue children, 
especially black children, with a positive sense of their intellectual 
worth and should provide them with a commensurate quality of 
educational experience. Specifically, the Court described the sort of 
education that children should be positioned to take advantage of: an 
education that prepares them for "good citizenship," that initiates them 
into the ranks of the culturally literate, and that gives them the 
grounding for "later professional training.,,52 Note that an education of 
this ilk is not limited to the basics, but rather entails a well-rounded and 
sophisticated curriculum designed to help all children mature into 
personally fulfilled adults who will be able to make meaningful 
contributions to society.53 The Brown I decision was contextual, and 
50. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (remarking that segregation in public 
education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
51. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.ll (1954) (quoting from a Kansas 
lower court in the Brown I litigation). 
52. Id. at 493. 
53. See Bitensky, Dream, supra note 20, at 6, nn.25-26 (stating how quality education 
prepares students for life and active community participation); David Chang, The Bus Stops Here: 
Defining the Constitutional Right of Equal Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate 
Remedial Process, 63 B.D. L. REV. 1,33-34 (1983) (discussing how education aids people in 
acquiring skills that are rewarded in society and equips blacks to compete in society); Marvin P. 
Dawkins & Jomills H. Braddock II, The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial 
Composition and Arican-American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. NEGRO EOUc. 394, 394, 
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that context was a concern for a high standard of education in the public 
schools and for black children's receptive psychological condition as a 
predicate to benefiting from such an education. Desegregation that 
would result in racially-integrated schoolhouses offering substandard 
education or even offering excellent education to children 
psychologically unable to profit from it would be an incomplete, if not 
perverse, realization of Brown I' s import. This concern is the more 
subtle part of Brown I's holding, what Professor Robert Sedler has 
dubbed Brown I's "educational rationale,"54 and what I would also call 
its "psychological enabling component." 
The constitutional standard which apparently should follow from this 
aspect of Brown I is that meaningful equal protection must involve 
public elementary and secondary schools in a process of psychological 
enabling: that is, psychologically enabling African-American children 
to have the confidence to succeed in a superior educational milieu. At 
the very least, the post-Brown I Equal Protection Clause should be 
understood to prohibit public schools from doing anything to deride or 
undercut that confidence. 
Ingraham significantly hinders the fruition of Brown I's commitment 
to educational excellence and psychological enabling. Recall the 
Ingraham Court's holding that the Eighth Amendment does not protect 
children in any way from corporal punishment in the nation's public 
elementary and secondary schools. 55 As of this writing, slightly under 
one-half of the states have availed themselves of Ingraham's latitude by 
403 (1994) (remarking how desegregation has a positive effect on career goals and social 
assimilation); Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of 
Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1050,1053 (1984) (discussing the psychological and academic 
harm that results from segregated schools). But see Brown, supra note 20, at 837-38 (contending 
that Brown I may actually have impeded African-American empowerment because the Court 
focused on the notion that racial segregation retards the intellectual development only of minority 
children). 
54. Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big 
Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 543 
(1975). Professor Sedler wrote: "The Supreme Court in Brown had proceeded upon the 
educational rationale that racial segregation was harmful to black children because it deprived 
them 'of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system. '" Id. at 
548 (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494). See also Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not 
Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School 
Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 437 (2003) (referring to Brown J's commitment to 
providing all children with "a quality education"); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal 
Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOc. CHANGE 1,4-5 (1997) (describing 
Brown I as a "profound statement about the importance of a quality education to a child's 
welfare," a principle "essential to the case"). 
55. See supra notes 30, 32 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ingraham court 
rejected the claim that corporal punishment of public school children as a disciplinary technique 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
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enacting legislation permitting corporal punishment of children in the 
schools. 56 This situation, I submit, is a conducive strategy-equally as 
conduci ve as segregation - for making African-American children feel 
inferior and thereby stifling their intellectual growth. 
How can that be? What is the basis for making such an assertion? 
The first thing to remark by way of explanation is that the most recent 
scientific evidence has dispositi vely established that corporal 
punishment of children, regardless of its venue or the racial identity of 
the children, is correlated with ten seriously adverse psychological 
outcomes for the child-victims. In 2002, psychologist Dr. Elizabeth 
Gershoff published meta-analyses that established an association 
between parental corporal punishment of children and (1) decreased 
moral internalization, (2) increased child aggression, (3) increased child 
delinquent and antisocial conduct, (4) decreased quality of the parent-
child relationship, (5) decreased child mental health, (6) increased risk 
of undergoing conventional physical child abuse; and, upon reaching 
maturity, (7) increased adult aggression, (8) increased adult criminal 
and antisocial behavior, (9) decreased adult mental health, and (10) 
increased risk of abusing one's own child or spouse.57 She has since 
theorized that, in light of some of the parallels between the parent-child 
and teacher-student relationship, these negative impacts may result from 
56. See Center for Effective Discipline, U.S. Statistics on Corporal Punishment by State and 
Race: States Banning Corporal Punishment, at http://www.stophitting.org/disatschool! 
statesBanning.php (last visited Sept 26, 2004) [hereinafter Center for Effective Discipline, States 
Banning] (discussing state statistics on corporal punishment in the United States). Idaho, 
Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Indiana permit corporal punishment statewide. ld. 
Wyoming, Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania have corporal punishment on a district-by-district basis, but more than half of 
students live in districts without corporal punishment. ld. For the sake of clarity, it should be 
pointed out that states that still permit school corporal punishment do just that-they permit 
rather than mandate such punishment. No states require corporal punishment of misbehaving 
students. See, e.g., Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment in America's Public Schools and 
the U.N. Convention on the Rights o/the Child: A Case for Nonratification, 29 J.L. & Eouc. 125, 
129 (2000) (discussing that the "amount and severity of corporal punishment has decreased in the 
twentieth century" in American schools and that even the states which do permit corporal 
punishment in schools do not require the use of physical force in disciplining students); Kathryn 
R. Urbonya, Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to 
Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 397,427-32 (2001) (discussing 
that, as of 2001, nineteen states expressly forbade corporal punishment in schools and only two 
states directly allowed school officials to use physical discipline). 
57. Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child 
Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 
543-44 (2002). 
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school corporal punishment as well. 58 
It does not require a degree in psychology to figure out that some of 
these outcomes will indispose children to learn optimally or even 
minimally. For example, an overly aggressive child or a child plagued 
by emotional instability is sure to be distracted by more pressing urges 
and needs than soaking up the school curricula. As a matter of fact, 
Professor Irwin Hyman, a psychologist who has extensively studied 
school corporal punishment, has concluded that corporal punishment 
does indeed interfere with students' ability to do schoolwork. 59 
I suppose putting children at risk of these insalubrious outcomes 
might be warranted if the scientific evidence also disclosed some 
extraordinary advantage unique to physical punishment, or if there was 
no other means of disciplining students. Nobody on either side of the 
spanking debate wants to deprive children of beneficial discipline or to 
turn schools into dens of iniquity or chaos. Dr. Gershoff's meta-
analyses do reveal that corporal punishment is correlated with one 
arguably positive outcome: a smack will cause a child temporarily to 
cease his or her misconduct.60 Since cessation is fleeting, however, this 
outcome is hardly the type of advantage that would justify endangering 
children in the ways identified by Dr. Gershoff. 
Moreover, there are more effective alternative disciplinary techniques 
for controlling children and instilling them with moral values. Schools 
have at their disposal an array of traditional non-corporal penalties that 
may be imposed such as expUlsion, suspension, detention and parental 
pick-upS.61 Time-outs, deprivation of privileges, and explaining why 
misbehavior is unacceptable can readily be adapted to the school 
context.62 There are also programs especially suitable to employing 
58. Email from Dr. Elizabeth Gershoff,Dept. of Social Work,University of Michigan, to 
Susan H. Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law, I (Sept. I, 
2004). 
59. See IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE ApPALLING 
STORY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 96, 99 (1990) 
(stating that approximately seventy percent of students with traumatic stress symptoms tend to 
have problems with academic performance); see also Murray A. Straus, New Evidence for the 
Benefits of Never Spanking, SOCIETY, Sept.lOct. 2001, at 52, 55-56 (asserting that there is 
evidence that corporal punishment of young children may undermine the foundations for 
cognitive development so that these children will continue to have difficulties with cognitive 
skills later in childhood). 
60. Gershoff, supra note 57, at 543-44. 
61. See Center for Effective Discipline, School Corporal Punishment Alternatives, at 
http://stophitting.comJdisatschoolJalternatives.php (last visited July 15, 2004) (discussing school 
corporal punishment alternatives and misbehavior prevention) [hereinafter Center for Effective 
Discipline, Punishment Alternatives]. 
62. Cf MICHAEL J. MARSHALL, WHY SPANKING DOESN'T WORK: STOPPING THE BAD HABIT 
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school resources. These programs include providing character 
education curriculum, enlisting the assistance of school psychologists 
and counselors, giving student recognition awards for good behavior, 
and peer mediation.63 
Dr. Gershoff's scientific findings, however, apply to all children. On 
what grounds, then, can I argue that Ingraham and its legacy has 
particularly and uniquely disadvantaged black schoolchildren? Those 
grounds lie in American history and in the racial bias with which school 
corporal punishment is presently administered. It is an undisputed 
historical fact that in the antebellum South it was de rigueur for 
slaveholders to whip or beat their slaves with impunity.64 Apparently, 
slaveholders believed that physical coercion would produce docility 
without offending moral or legal precepts because the victims were 
slaves. One historian has instructed that the lash was the primary means 
of controlling slaves.65 Another has revealed that the practice was so 
pervasive that many slaves actually conceptualized freedom as 
"abolition of punishment by the lash."66 Moreover, although the Civil 
War put an end to slavery, it did not stop whites' corporal punishment 
of blacks. Freed slaves were still frequently hit,67 especially if they had 
AND GEITING THE UPPER HAND ON EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE 123 (2002) (recommending that 
parents should try time-out and revoking privileges to discipline their children); JANE NELSEN, ET 
AL., POSITIVE DISCIPLINE A-Z: 1001 SOLUTIONS TO EVERYDAY PARENTING PROBLEMS, 5, 
23-26 (1993) (suggesting that parents should use family discussions and time-out in disciplining 
their children). 
63. Center for Effective Discipline, Punishment Alternatives, supra note 61. 
64. Everette Swinney, Suppressing the Ku Klux Klan*: The Enforcement of the 
Reconstruction Amendments 1870-1874, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: 
A GARLAND SERIES OF OUTSTANDING DISSERTATIONS 36-37 (Harold Hyman, et al. eds., 1987). 
For additional historical accounts of the flogging of slaves, see JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE 
SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 251 (1979); FREDERICK 
DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 52, 121 (Rayford W. Logan ed., 
1962) (1892); PAGE SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE, 615-16 (1981); Aremona G. Bennett, 
Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security and Subversion of 
Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation, 1865-1910,70 CHI. KENT L. REv. 
439,440 (1994). 
65. Swinney, supra note 64, at 36-37. 
66. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 
78 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988). 
67. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND 
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868 passim (Harold M. Hyman & William P. Hobby 
eds., 1979) (giving examples of freedmen beaten and shot like wild animals); GEORGE C. RABLE, 
BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 72-
73 (1984) (stating that freedmen were shot and whipped to influence votes); ALLEN W. 
TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE K U K LUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN 
RECONSTRUCTION passim (Kenneth B. Clark, ed., 1971 ) (discussing incidents of blacks being 
lashed, beaten, and murdered); Swinney, supra note 64, at 51-52, 208-{)9, 217-18, 279 
(remarking that the Klan was responsible for hundreds of whippings in the late 1870s). 
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the temerity to achieve economic success or to exercise their political 
and legal rights.68 As one observer described upon touring the newly 
defeated South, corporal punishment of blacks remained a "habit so 
inveterate with a great many persons as to render, on the least 
provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible.,,69 
During Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other like-minded 
ruffians terrorized the southern black population and its allies.70 These 
vigilantes thought nothing of intimidating and assaulting entire black 
families'? I The Klan persecuted freedmen and freedwomen with a 
repertoire of shootings, lynchings, and whippings, as well as with more 
outlandish crimes.72 "Whipping, however, appears to have continued 
from the days of slavery as a favorite, if not almost reflexive, means" of 
keeping black Southerners under white thumbs.73 The extent of this 
violence against blacks, even after emancipation, cannot be overstated. 
After the war, this became such a problem that Congress was moved to 
enact a series of statutes crafted to halt these and other continuing 
transgressions against blacks.74 
Thus, for black schoolchildren in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, corporal punishment has been and is loaded with connotations 
of racism, hate, and oppression. Corporal punishment reverberates with 
the collective historical experience of blacks writhing under the rod 
during slavery and its aftermath. Indeed, incidents of Klan beatings of 
68. See TRELEASE, supra note 67, passim (discussing incidents of blacks being lashed, beaten, 
and murdered). 
69. 1 CARL SCHURZ, Report on the Condition of the South, in SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE 
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 279, 316 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913). 
70. FONER, supra note 66, at 425-36; Swinney, supra note 64, at 46-48; TRELEASE, supra 
note 67, at xxxiv. 
71. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 437-38 (1871) (statement of Rep. Cobb); FONER, 
supra note 66, at 119,427,429-30; NIEMAN, supra note 67, at 124; TRELEASE, supra note 67, 
passim. 
72. FONER, supra note 66, at 426-31; DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": 
PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 24-28, 100 (1996); RABLE, supra 
note 67, at 28-30,98; TRELEASE, supra note 67, passim; Swinney, supra note 64, at 48,208--09, 
216--17,250. 
73. Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent of Peace or Vehicle of Violence Against 
Children?, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 333, 334 (200 I) [hereinafter Bitensky, Agent of Peace]. 
74. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (stating that any injured 
party who was deprived of their rights now has redress under the laws); Reconstruction Act of 
1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (calling for an Act that called for military forces to suppress 
insurrections); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (declaring blacks are citizens 
of the United States and have the rights and protections of freedmen); Freedman's Bureau Act of 
1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) (establishing a War Department to control all subjects relating 
to freedmen). 
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blacks continued right into the twentieth century.75 Not unlike the 
Klan's cross burnings in its black neighbors' yards,76 corporal 
punishment of American black schoolchildren is fraught with odious 
meanings and implications not readily apparent to their white 
counterparts. And, these are meanings and implications of 
objectification of blacks as "property," or, if not "property," 
objectification of these children as holding some kind of sub-human 
status.77 
To add insult to injury, statistics for the 1999-2000 academic year 
show that "[b]lack students are hit at a rate that is more than twice their 
makeup in the population. Blacks comprise 17% of students, but 
receive 39% of paddlings. Whites make up 62% of all students, but 
receive 53% of the corporal punishment.,,78 Along similar lines, a 
Memphis City Schools study published in 2004 shows that in the 
Memphis school district, "[b]lack students and boys were 
overwhelmingly more likely to get spanked than their white and female 
counterparts. Roughly 97% of the 27,918 paddlings last year were 
given to the district's black children, while only 2% were given to white 
children.,,79 The fact that corporal punishment both resurrects a semi-
chattel status for blacks and in modern times is used at least twice as 
frequently on black pupils as on white students can only compound the 
toll that this form of punishment takes on black children's self-esteem 
and aspirations. 
If ever a pedagogical practice was to carry the potential for making 
African-American schoolchildren feel inferior and for thwarting their 
opportunity for educational progress, corporal punishment would seem 
to be that practice. Allowing such punishment to persist in the schools 
is hardly the psychological enabling of individual educational potential 
that Brown I requires. 80 In giving public schools carte blanche approval 
75. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354-55 (2003) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, I., 
opinion of the Court) (discussing acts of Klan violence occurring in the 1920s and during the civil 
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s); See id. at 389-90 (Thomas, I., dissenting) (discussing 
the Klan's use of violence in the 1900s). 
76. See id. at 352-57 & 360 n.2 (recognizing a burning cross as a symbol of hate and white 
supremacy). 
77. See SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATION (forthcoming 2005). 
78. Center for Effective Discipline, States Banning, supra note 56. I was advised of the year 
for which the above-referenced statistics are valid by the Executive Director of the Center for 
Effective Discipline. Telephone Interview with Nadine Block, Executive Director, Center for 
Effective Discipline (Feb. 4, 2004). 
79. Ruma Banerji Kumar, Paddling May Not Really Be Last Resort, Data Show, COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 27, 2004 at B I. 
80. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing how corporal punishment 
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to use corporal punishment on children as far as the Eighth Amendment 
is concerned, Ingraham v. Wright represents the dashing of Brown /'s 
rich potential and of its chief concerns. 
Ingraham does not interfere, of course, with the political discretion of 
individual states to outlaw school corporal punishment. But, in the 
absence of Eighth Amendment restraints, approximately half of the 
states have seen fit to allow such punishment;81 although, of these, some 
states have delegated power to local school districts to prohibit the 
punishment on a district-by-district basis.82 The result is that in many 
areas of the United States, school corporal punishment 
continues-meaning that many black schoolchildren cannot fully 
benefit from Brown /' s psychological enabling component. Moreover, 
the Ingraham holding telegraphs quite a punch to the black community, 
including its children. The Ingraham holding plays a deleterious 
pedagogical role in conveying that the U.S. Constitution is no barrier to 
the existence of the remnants of slavery and can offer no succor to the 
youngest victims of slavery's legacy.83 
Incidentally, in identifying the infirmities that corporal punishment 
may inflict on any child, white or black, some social science researchers 
hinders a child's well-being and undermines the decision of Brown I). 
81. See supra note 55-56 and accompanying text (remarking that some states still allow 
corporal punishment in schools). 
82. See Irwin A. Hyman et ai., Paddling and Pro-Paddling Polemics: Refuting Nineteenth 
Century Pedagogy, 31 J. L. & Eouc. 74,77-78 (2002); Urbonya, supra note 56, at 427-32. 
83. As I have written elsewhere: 
Generally speaking, there is a pedagogical purpose inherent in virtually all law. Laws 
are made to be known; otherwise, they would be ineffective as an instrument of 
governance or restraint. The educational impact of law is perhaps most effectually 
realized by the reciprocal interplay between law and social values. Law draws its 
content from the values of the people it governs. Law assimilates not only a society's 
values and priorities as they are, but also those values and priorities which comprise 
that society's goals and needs. It is in this latter initiatory phase that law has its most 
dramatic educative effect because it crystallizes and makes visible the norms which 
constitute a society's aspirations and ideals. 
Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime 
Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 441 (1998) 
[hereinafter Bitensky, Spare the Rod]. For examples of other works on the pedagogical role of 
law see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927, 952 (W.D. 
Ross trans. & Richard McKeon ed., 1941); Plato, Book VII, in THE LAWS OF PLATO 215-16 
(Thomas L. Pangle trans. & ed., 1980); David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests and Power 
Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 127, 162-63 (1988); Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: 
Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 177-79 (1986); Keith Burgess-Jackson, 
Bad Samaritan ism and the Pedagogical Function of Law, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 1,3-4,26 (1985); 
Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
458,468-69 (1988); Philip Soper, The Moral Value of Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 63, 85 (1985). 
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and theorists have proposed what I have labeled the "African-American 
exception.,,84 They have advanced the notion that paddling does no 
harm to and, in fact, is beneficial for black children in the United States 
even if such punishment harms white children.85 Proponents of the 
exception frequently offer as an explanation for it that strong physical 
chastisement is necessary to keep black children out of trouble in crime-
ridden environments.86 
I emphatically decline to adopt this relativistic approach, depending 
on skin color, to corporal punishment of children. The "African-
American exception" is hardly an irrefutable fact. There are other, 
equally respected social science researchers and theorists who have 
posited that corporal punishment may be detrimental to black children 
as well.87 Indeed, Dr. Gershoff's recent meta-analyses have found an 
association between corporal punishment of children and serious 
negative behavioral outcomes regardless of the race of the children 
involved,88 thereby making short work of the exceptionalists. But, even 
assuming arguendo that there is a split of authority on the subject, I 
would prefer to err, if error it is, on the side of repUdiating a punishment 
that has well-known antecedents in the whipping of American slaves. 
Recommending its retention particularly for black children seems a 
most grievous thing, constituting further unequal treatment of black 
84. BITENSKY, Agent of Peace, supra note 73. 
85. See, e.g., Marjorie Linder Gunnoe & Carrie Lea Mariner, Toward A Developmental-
Contextual Model of the Effects of Parental Spanking on Children's Aggression, lSI ARCHIVES 
OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 768, 774 (1997) (reporting that corporal punishment of 
African-American children deters subsequent fighting by them); Robert E. Larzelere, Child 
Outcomes of Nonabusive and Customary Physical Punishment by Parents: An Updated 
Literature Review,3 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 210, 213 (2000) 
(summarizing that studies show spanking to have neutral or beneficial effects on African-
American children); Arthur L. Whaley, Sociocultrual Differences in the Developmental 
Consequences of the Use of Physical Discipline During Childhood for Arican-Americans, 6 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 5, 7-10 (2000) (stating that the results of 
studies concerning the effects of corporal punishment on African-American children are 
inconsistent, but that none of the studies demonstrate such punishment to cause disruptive 
disorders in these children). 
86. See MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILDREN 117 (2001) 
(summarizing one of the rationales of those pundits who wish to retain corporal punishment for 
black children). 
87. See, e.g., JAMES P. COMER & ALVIN F. POUSSAINT, RAISING BLACK CHILDREN: Two 
LEADING PSYCHIATRISTS CONFRONT THE EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS 
FACING BLACK CHILDREN 49-51 (1992) (stating that those children punished by hitting have a 
greater tendency for violence); Kristin M. McCabe et ai., Family Protective Factors Among 
Urban African-American Youth, 28 1. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 137, 139, 147 (1999). 
88. See Gershoff, supra note 57, at 543-44 (indicating parental corporal punishment is 
associated with undesirable behaviors and experiences). 
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children, both in comparison to adults and to children of other races. 
Human beings have it in common to flinch from pain; they share 
psychological reactions to being rendered simultaneously helpless and 
maddened by the use of force against which there is no recourse.89 
There is a universal hunger for bodily integrity and right treatment, as 
well as for a respect that recognizes each person's humanity.90 To 
adopt this form of African-American exceptionalism is to deny black 
children fulfillment of this fundamental aspect of their human nature 
and to put them on the same footing as their enslaved ancestors.91 This 
is, of course, totally unacceptable both morally and humanistically 
speaking. 
IV. UNDOING INGRAHAM'S BETRAYAL OF BROWN I 
Before proposing legal reform to revive Brown I's full vitality for 
black children, it may be helpful for me to summarize my thesis up to 
this point. Corporal punishment of black schoolchildren is laden with 
historical and cultural messages that they are inferior to other children, 
and these messages are reinforced by the fact that black students are 
twice as likely to suffer such punishment as white students. The lack of 
confidence thereby inspired in African-American students is apt to 
interfere with the learning process. It was precisely the Supreme 
Court's dismay over black children'S harboring such inferiority feelings, 
with the resultant impediment to education, that undergirded and 
formed part of the holding in Brown I. When the Ingraham Court ruled 
that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to public school corporal 
punishment, the Court effectively sanctioned the continuation of this 
practice as a constitutional matter and betrayed Brown I's potential to 
equalize, truly and substantively, schooling for blacks and whites in this 
country. 
Can anything be done to remedy the damage Ingraham has wrought? 
There is probably no way to repair the inferiority feelings and 
educational loss suffered by black schoolchildren in the past. Those 
children cannot have a "rerun" of their childhoods and of the 
developmental milestones through which they passed under the burden 
of corporal punishment. However, there are feasible and long overdue 
89. Bitensky, Spare the Rod. supra note 83, at 423. 
90. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN PARTS I AND II 106, 149 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., 
1958) (commenting on the respect that people naturally seek from each other); IMMANUEL KANT, 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54, 56 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) 
(1796-97) (recommending that people should regard themselves as an end rather than simply a 
means and that every person ought to be his or her own master as a matter of right). 
91. See generally Bitensky, Agent of Peace, supra note 73. 
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measures that can be taken to spare future generations of black 
schoolchildren from the same fate. 
The time has come to overturn Ingraham v. Wright. Yes, I know, 
stare decisis and all that. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has not shied 
away from reversing course when it has perceived its direction to be 
outdated and/or misguided.92 Ingraham, a 5-4 decision to begin with,93 
is ripe for overruling for several reasons in relation to its Eighth 
Amendment holding.94 First, the decision was not convincingly 
reasoned when it was made in 1977.95 Justice White's Ingraham 
dissent highlights that a textualist construction of the Eighth 
Amendment conflicts outright with the majority's originalist 
interpretation limiting the amendment's application to criminal 
proceedings - the latter interpretation created out of a patchwork of 
inferences rather than from any directly relevant historical evidence.96 
Justice White explains that the Framers' failure to cabin the language of 
the Amendment with the word "criminal" demonstrates that the 
provision was drafted to forbid "all inhumane or barbaric punishments, 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-58, 561, 567 (1995) (effectively 
narrowing congressional Commerce Clause power to regulating only economic activities after 
decades of upholding a broader interpretation of the Clause); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976), in relation to federalism as a restraint on Congress's Commerce Clause power to 
regulate state activities); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (effectively 
repudiating the separate-but-equal doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896)). 
93. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
94. There seems to be an inexplicable dearth of commentary critiquing the holding of 
Ingraham in relation to the Eighth Amendment. But see Lynn Roy, Chalk Talk: Corporal 
Punishment in American Public Schools and the Rights of the Child, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 554, 
558-59,563 (2001) (taking the Ingraham majority to task for deviating from the Court's own 
previously used standards in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, for failing to give the 
amendment a "'flexible and dynamic'" construction and calling for lower federal courts to 
subvert the effects of Ingraham); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407, 447 (1998) (observing that "Ingraham's entire 
discussion of the scope of the Eighth Amendment is now of dubious value" since the Court 
subsequently ruled in another case that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause governs 
civil forfeiture proceedings); RONALD T. HYMAN & CHARLES H. RATHBONE, CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS: READING THE LA W 3-4 (1993) (paraphrasing another scholar's 
indictment of the Ingraham Court's Eighth Amendment analysis in Irene Merker Rosenberg, 
Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 76-89 (1978)); 
infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws of the majority's reasoning in 
Ingraham). 
95. HYMAN & RATHBONE, supra note 94, at 3; Roy, supra note 94, at 554, 558-59. 
96. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-66; see also Victoria J. Dodd, The Education Justice: The 
Honorable Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 683, 691 (2001) (detailing that 
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Ingraham relied upon the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
of 1776 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 in ascribing meaning to the Eighth Amendment). 
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no matter what the nature of the offense for which the punishment is 
imposed.,,97 At a minimum, Justice White's sensible textualism raises 
questions about the plausibility of an originalist analysis predicated 
entirely on inferences drawn by the Court. 
Moreover, as Justice White observes, the Supreme Court itself has 
not limited the application of the Eighth Amendment only to criminal 
punishments.98 For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,99 the Court held that 
intentional disregard by correctional authorities of prisoners' medical 
needs violated the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and 
unusual punishments. 100 Obviously, ignoring a prisoner's medical 
needs is not a judicially-imposed punishment for perpetration of a 
crime. 101 
Finally, the Ingraham majority opinion's attempt to immunize school 
corporal punishment from Eighth Amendment strictures on the theory 
that schoolchildren are in certain key ways distinguishable from 
prisoners seems embarrassingly flimsy.102 I am not suggesting that the 
Court erred because schoolchildern are subject to exactly the same 
circumstances as prisoners; clearly, there are many circumstances that 
are different for each group. The problem is that the particular living 
conditions selected by the Court are ones actually shared by 
schoolchildren and prisoners, at least to an appreciable degree. School 
attendance is not, as the majority opinion suggests, sometimes 
involuntary. 103 All states make a number of years of schooling 
compulsory.I04 Children, and not just the "very young" ones singled 
97. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 685 (White, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 688 nA (White, J., dissenting). 
99. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
100. Id. at 104-{)5, 108. 
IO!. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 688 nA (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth 
Amendment's application extends beyond criminal punishments). 
102. /d. at 668-70. 
103. Id. at 670. 
104. The Ingraham majority acknowledged that compulsory education was mandated in New 
England even before the American Revolution and that by 1918 compulsory school attendance 
laws were in effect in all states. Id. at 661 n.14. Such laws are still in existence. See National 
Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2002: Ch.2. Elementary and 
Secondary Education: Table 150, at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digestJd02/tables/dtl50.asp (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2004) (containing table 150, prepared in May, 200 I, covering statistics on 
compulsory education in each state as of 2000, except for Colorado and the District of Columbia); 
Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman, When Individual Differences Demand Equal 
Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach to the Special Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice 
System, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 42 & n.189 (2003) (emphasizing that all fifty states have 
compulsory education laws requiring fifteen-year olds to attend school); Judith G. McMullen, 
Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate Homeschooling?, 54 S.C. L. REv. 75, 98 (2002) 
(analyzing states' compulsory education laws in light of homeschooling). 
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out by the Court,105 are therefore restrained from leaving school during 
school hours. To say, as the majority did, that a child "brings with him 
[to school] the support of family and friends,,106 is chimerical, a notion 
unsupported by any data; and more appropriate to a romantic, Norman 
Rockwellian vision of the lives of American schoolchildren. Indeed, 
during my stint as Associate Counsel to the New York City Board of 
Education, it was quite evident that many children saw their schools as 
refuges from dysfunctional, abusive and/or neglectful families and the 
often anarchic neighborhoods in which they resided. The majority's 
further offering that children in school have the protection of their 
teachers,107 strikes me as a ridiculous distinction since it is usually the 
teachers who do the punishing. 
Ill-conceived when it was decided in 1977, Ingraham has become 
increasingly absurd. For example, consider it in comparison to the 
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Hudson v. McMillian. 108 In that case, 
a prison inmate was beaten by security guards while he was handcuffed 
and shackled. 109 The guards punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and 
stomach, and kicked him from· behind. I 10 As a result, the victim 
suffered minor bruises and swelling, some loosened teeth, and a crack in 
his partial dental plate. I I I The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the use of force to be excessive but refused 
to rule for the prisoner because his injuries were minor, requiring no . 
medical attention. II2 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use 
of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation even though the prisoner's injuries, which must 
be more than de minimis, are minor. I13 In contrast, in Ingraham a 
schoolchild who suffered injuries requiring medical intervention after 
being paddled over twenty times was denied recourse to an Eighth 
Amendment claim. II4 Putting Ingraham together with Hudson creates 
the bizarre situation in which convicted criminals are afforded more 
protection against violence in prison than children are provided in 
school. Something is very wrong with this picture, and the defect is in 
105. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
109. Id. at 4. 
110. Id. 
Ill. Id. 
112. Id. at 5. 
113. Id. at 9-10. 
114. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,657 (1977). 
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Ingraham, not Hudson. 
Ill-conceived when Ingraham was decided in 1977 and made absurd 
by juxtaposition of the Hudson case in 1992, it is now fair to say that 
Ingraham has become a complete anachronism in 2004. No, that is too 
kind. Ingraham is rotting on the vine and continuing to damage lives in 
the process. There is no reason why, under the Supreme Court's own 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Ingraham should not be long gone. 
It is well accepted that the cryptic phraseology of "cruel and unusual 
punishments" in the Eighth Amendment can best be meaningfully 
interpreted and applied by resorting to sources beyond the Constitution 
itself. The Supreme Court has determined that the Clause "must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,,115 and that it's meaning may be updated 
"as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.,,116 
Standards of decency and humanity do evolve. They are affected by 
increasing knowledge and by a populace's gravitation, sometimes 
sudden and sometimes incremental, toward altered practices. There are 
signs that a palpable evolution has taken place within the United States 
in relation to corporal punishment of children - signs that were not 
present when Ingraham was decided in 1977. Our knowledge base has 
undergone a radical expansion with respect to understanding corporal 
punishment's possible detrimental outcomes for children, as disclosed 
by Gershoff's meta-analyses. 1I7 Commentators have begun sharpening 
our awareness of corporal punishment's link to slavery and racism. 1I8 
There is a growing consensus among child-care and other professionals 
in the United States that school corporal punishment should be 
forbidden. I 19 And, unlike the situation in 1977 when only two states 
115. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
311-12 (2002); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002) (referring to the Eighth 
Amendment's import in terms of contemporary values of decency, dignity and civilization). 
116. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). 
117. Gershoff, supra note 57, at 5~8. 
118. See, e.g., STRAUS & DONNELLY, supra note 86, at 117 (asserting that "corporal 
punishment has become a part of black culture in response to slavery and oppression"); Bitensky, 
Agent of Peace, supra note 73, at 333-35 (noting abolitionists criticized both slavery and fought 
to end corporal punishment of children); Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra note 83, at 422-23 
(hypothesizing that corporal punishment has its roots in slavery). 
119. Among the forty national organizations opposed to school corporal punishment are the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Bar Association, the American Medical 
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the 
National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, the National Association of Social Workers, the National 
Education Association, the National Mental Health Association, the National Association of 
School Nurses, the National Association of School Psychologists, and the National Association of 
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banned this punishment,120 now more than half of the states prohibit 
it. 121 In short, the standards of decency and humanity have been 
shifting rather dramatically against physical chastisement of children in 
American schools. 
At times and on an unpredictable basis, the Supreme Court has also 
consulted international and foreign law in order to define the evolving 
standards of decency in a given period. 122 If the Court was to use this 
interpretive technique in a relitigation of school corporal punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment, I suspect that the Justices would be 
shocked at what they would find. At least five human rights treaties 
have been authoritatively construed to implicitly prohibit not just school 
corporal punishment of children but a II corporal punishment of 
children. 123 Those treaties are the United Nations Convention on the 
State Boards of Education. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS): U.S. 
Organizations Opposed to School Corporal Punishment, at http://www.stophitting.org/ 
disatschoollusorgs.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). 
120. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (referring to Massachusetts and New 
Jersey as the only two states that had outlawed all corporal punishment in the public elementary 
and secondary schools as of 1977). 
121. See Center for Effective Discipline, States Banning, supra note 56 (observing that 
currently twenty-six states have banned corporal punishment and nine other states have more than 
half of all students in districts with no corporal punishment). 
122. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND 
PROCESS 740-42 (3d ed. 2001). 
123. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 28th Sess., , 36, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.79 (2002) (recommending that, under Article 10 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, corporal punishment of children in families should be 
forbidden); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Paraguay, 
28th Sess.," 31-32, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.166 (2001) (interpreting Article 19 of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as prohibiting corporal punishment of children); General 
Observations of the European Committee of Social Rights Regarding Articles 7, Para. /0, and 17, 
Conclusions XV-2, Vol. I, at 26-29 (2001) (observing that Article 17 of the European Social 
Charter and the European Social Charter (revised) bar corporal punishment of children); 
Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights Concerning Articles 2-4,7-11,14-15, 
and 17-18 of the Charter in Respect of Poland, Conclusions XV-2, Vol.2, at 407, 468 (2001) 
(inquiring whether Poland has enacted legislation banning all corporal punishment by children so 
as to comply with Article 17 of the European Social Charter); Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Guyana, 68th Sess., , 12, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add.121 (2000) 
(urging that, under Article 7 of the International Coveneant on Civil and Political Rights, Guyana 
"should take legal and other measurs to eliminate this practice [of corporal punishment of 
children],,); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom and 
Northern Irealnd-the Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man, 68th Sess. 
§ II, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/ Add.1l9 (2000) (recommending, under Articles 7 and 10 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "the adoption of legislation to outlaw 
corporal punishment" of children on the Isle of Man); General Comment No. 13 of the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 21st Sess.,' 41, U.N. Doc. E/C.l2/1999/10 (1999) 
(construing Article 13, paragraph I of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights to prohibit school corporal punishment); Concluding Observations of the 
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Rights of the Child,124 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,125 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,126 the European Social Charters,127 and the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 128 That corporal punishment is a human 
rights law violation marks the evolving standards of decency in the 
international community with respect to right treatment of children and 
reflects an advance in our comprehension as to what is "humane justice" 
toward children. As such, this body of human rights law should infuse 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of whether and how 
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment applies to corporal punishment in public schools. 
Similarly, if the Court in this hypothetical relitigation was to refer to 
the laws of foreign jurisdictions, it would learn that, as of this writing, 
fourteen countries have banned all corporal punishment of children 
within their respective borders. Those countries are Sweden, Finland, 
Norway, Denmark, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Iceland, Croatia, Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Israel, Ukraine, and Romania. 129 In addition, all industrialized 
countries except, the United States and one state in Australia, have 
banned school corporal punishment of children. 130 These facts too are 
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Japan, 18th Sess., ~ 45, U.N. Doc. CRC/CI15/Add. 90 
(1998) (reading Article 19 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child as prohibiting 
corporal punishment of children); Annual Report: Areas in Which Steps Need to Be Taken 
Towards Full Observance of the Human Rights Set Forth in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights, 1994 INTER-AM. 
Y.B. ON H.R. (INTER-AM. COMM'N ON H.R.) 690, 704 (stating that full compliance with the 
American Convention on Human Rights necessitates that states' parties should ratify the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child so as to ensure that children "are not the targets of 
violence."). See also Bitensky, Agent of Peace, supra note 73; Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra 
note 83, at 388-421 (observing that international human rights treaties "employ language that, 
either explicitly or implicitly obligates both the public and private sector to observe human 
rights"). 
124. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 
Supp. No. 49 (A/44/49), at 166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), available at 
http://www./unhchr.chlhtml/menu3/b/k2crc.htm. 
125. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Annex, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1967). 
126. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1967). 
127. European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 31, European Social 
Charter, Oct. 18,1961,519 D.N.T.S. 89. 
128. American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L.VIl1.82, doc. 6 rev. 1, at 25 (1992). 
129. See Bitensky, Agent of the Peace, supra note 73; see also Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra 
note 83, at 361-86 (recounting that as of 1998, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and 
Cyprus had enacted bans on all corporal punishment of children and Italy's highest court had 
issued a decision to that effect). 
130. See Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS): Facts About 
Corporal Punishment Worldwide, at http://www.stophitting.org/disatschool/worldwide.php (last 
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persuasive evidence of evolving modern standards of 
decency-evidence available to inform any reconsideration of whether 
the Eighth Amendment should apply to corporal punishment in the 
public schools and, if so, whether the amendment's application should 
dictate the abolition of the practice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ideally, what I would like to see happen is a relitigation of the Eighth 
Amendment issue using the interpretive technique and current 
information described above. Again, in the best of all possible worlds, I 
would like to see the Supreme Court hold that Ingraham is no more and 
that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments not 
only applies to public school corporal punishment, but actually forbids 
it. Without reading the ban into the Eighth Amendment, states will 
remain free to permit public school corporal punishment. Granted, in 
the absence of a constitutional ban, additional states could exercise the 
political will to enact their own prohibitions on public school corporal 
punishment, but this piecemeal approach could take forever, and some 
states might never embrace such a legal reform. In the meantime, in the 
intransigent states, Brown I' s quality education and psychological 
enabling components would continue to be undercut, and African-
American schoolchildren would continue to suffer the educationally 
disabling consequences. Neither of these results seems tolerable as a 
constitutional or a moral matter. 
Of course, repudiating Ingraham and recognizing a prohibition on 
corporal punishment of public schoolchildren in the Eighth Amendment 
will not by itself be a nostrum for all that ails Brown I or the education 
of African-Americans. Taking these steps is just that-some steps in 
the right direction. The problems posed in implementing Brown I and 
doing justice to black students in comparison to white students are 
complex and call for a multiplicity of ameliorative responses. The steps 
that I have proposed, however, at least remove one obstacle to and 
provide one prerequisite for the consummation of Brown I and the fuller 
blossoming of black schoolchildren's intellectual lives. 
visited Sept. 12, 2004). Until January 30, 2004, Canada was also one of the only industrialized 
countries to allow school corporal punishment. [d. However, on that date, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided a case in which it held, among other things, that school corporal punishment 
would no longer be legal in that nation. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. 
Canada, (Att'y Gen.), [2004] S.C.R. 76, available at http://www.canlii.org/ 
calcas/scc/2004/2004scc4.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). 
